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THE TRIUMPH OF SPIRIT OVER LAW: 
FREE WILL VERSUS DETERMINISM IN ADAM BEDE 
by William H. Klein 
One of the primary intellectual influences that shaped George Eliot's thought 
was positivism, or rather the various influence of positivistic philosophers 
such as Comte, Mill, Spencer, Feuerbach and Lewes, who each in his own 
way subscribed to an empiricism dictating that knowledge of anything but 
actual phenomena is impossible, and thus rejected any metaphysical specu-
lation concerning ultimate causes or origins. This is a broad definition of 
positivism, and perhaps generalizes at the expense of the fine points of the 
thinkers under discussion; however, George Eliot's ultimate rejection of the 
notion of a God whose existence cannot be empirically demonstrated was a 
result of the belief that "that which is beyond nature, if there is anything, is 
completely unknowable, and speculation about it and about the nature of 
things in themselves is fruitless." 1 
The process of nature as the positivists and as Eliot understood it constitutes 
a system of physical laws that are universally constant and inexorable, 
whereby cosmic movement is manifest whether in the cycle of the seasons or 
the death of a fly. This system of natural or cosmic law is causative: each 
phenomenon is the result of the interaction of countless other phenomena 
receding infinitely into the past. The existence of a divine being is neither 
affirmed nor denied by such a system, but it is not verifiable because it is an 
ultimate cause. Yet the system does intrinsically reject the idea of a deity who 
orders the universe for the sake of humanity or who "responds to men's 
prayers, or compensates forinjustice ... [This] is a waking dream of the human 
mind. There is no reprieve from death, and there is no forgiveness of sins; 
causes are invariably followed by their effects, and once a deed is done it is 
ineradicable. "2 In chapter xxvii of Adam Bede the narrator tells us: 
'For if it be true that nature at certain moments seems charged 
with a presentment of one individual lot, must it not also be true 
that she seems unniindful, unconscious of another? For there 
is no hour that has not its births of gladness and despair, no 
morning brightness that does not bring new sickness to desola-
tion as well as new forces to genius and love. There are so many 
of us and our lots are so different: what wonder that Nature's 
mood is often in harsh contrast with the great crisis of our 
lives?'3 
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Of the works of the positivist Ludwig Feuerbach, the most important to the 
development of Eliot's thought was Pas Wesens des Christentums (The 
Essence of Christianity), her translation of which appeared in 1857. Three 
years earlier she had written to Sara Rennell: "With the ideas of Feuerbach 
I everywhere agree."4 Indeed, Eliot's rejection of an omniscient Father who 
doles out just punishment and reward found definition in Feuerbach' s apho-
rism that' 'theology long ago became anthropology.' '5 For Feuerbach, God 
is merely the personification of human perfection that man has anthropomor-
phized and idealistically placed on the altar of his imagination: 
'It is not I but religion that worships man, although religion, or 
rather theology, denies it: it is not only I, an insignificant 
individual, but religion itself that says: God is man, man is God 
..... This is evident from the fact that religion makes God 
become man and only then sets up this God that has human 
form, human feeling and human thoughts as an object of its 
worship and reverence. '6 
Once Feuerbach has circumscribed what he believes to be the solipsism that 
Christianity presents as objective and absolute truth, he points to a human 
ideal attributed to God by man, one essential to the ethos of Christianity, 
which according to Feuerbach alienates the human mind from complete 
identification with deity: the attribute of moral perfection. In his chapter 
"God as a Moral Being, Or Law," in The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach 
understands the morally perfect god as "nothing else than the realized idea, 
the fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of man posited as the absolute 
being,' '7 a notion following logically from the concept of God as an image of 
man perfected by men. Feuerbach repudiates this morally perfect God, 
however, because it forces the human heart into conflict with itself. 
'This morally perfect being is no merely theoretical, inert 
conception, but a practical one, calling me to action, to imita-
tion, throwing me into strife, into disunion with myself; for 
while it proclaims to me what I ought to be, it also tells· me to 
my face, without any flattery, what I am not ..... Now, by what 
means does man deliver himself from this state of disunion 
between himself and the perfect being ... ? Only by this; that he 
is conscious of love as the highest, the absolute power and truth 
..... No man is sufficient for the law which moral perfection sets 
before us; but for that reason, neither is the law sufficient for 
man, the heart. The law gives me the consciousness that I am 
worthless. The law holds man in bondage; love makes him 
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free. Love is God himself and apart from it there is no God. 
Love makes man God and God man. '8 
The pervasive moral and philosophic perspective in all of George Eliot's 
novels involves a reliance on the God oflove for humanity over and above the 
love of God in the stricter sense of obedience to doctrine that is a central 
element of the Judaeo-Christian tradition: the triumph of spirit over law; for 
Eliot, sympathy for one's fellow man brings the individual to a greater 
understanding of himself and is largely a reciprocal process. Learning to love 
is the process from egoism to altruism,9 a process that Adam Bede does not 
fully accomplish until he has suffered through Hetty Sorrel's incarceration 
and trial. At his father's funeral in chapter xxviii he thinks to himself: "Ah, 
I was always too hard ..... It's a sore fault in me as I'm so hot and out of 
patience with people when they do wrong, and my heart gets shut up against 
them, so as I can't bring myself to forgive 'em. I see clear there's more pride 
nor love in my soul." 10 And in the next chapter, the novel's narrator, who is 
often a Feuerbachian voice in both tone and point of view, tells us: "Perhaps 
here lay the secret of the hardness he had accused himself of: he had too little 
fellow feeling with the weakness that errs in spite of foreseen consequences. 
Without this fellow feeling, how are we to get enough charity and patience 
towards our stumbling, falling companions in the long and changeful jour-
ney?"ll 
Through man's ability to love his fellow, Feuerbach would tell us, "man 
reconciles himself with God, or rather with his own nature as represented in 
the moral law." 12 As positivists, both Eliot and Feuerbach distinguish 
between what Bemard Paris calls' 'moral order" and "nonmoral order" .13 
Nonmoral order is that cosmic or teleologic law which acts independently of 
man's will or desire. The moral order, or law, is the ethical process, manifest 
in all social institutions and relationships that humanize the world. In terms 
of man, the latter process has been described as the movement from moral 
blindness to moral vision, the movement from egoism to altruism. However, 
the moral and nonmoral orders cannot function independently of one another 
according to the positivists because man is a product of empirical nature as 
much if not more than his own will, and so his decisions are the result of the 
interrelationship of both orders. Thus, if his decisions are determined by 
nature's nonmoral order, whether in part or whole, he is not ultimately 
responsible for his actions, or so Comte and Spencer assert. Then why attempt 
to decide or act at all? As deterministic as Eliot's thinking was, she still 
believed that we must decide, we must act, and that we can be held responsible 
82 
for what we do. As George Levine has suggested in his article, "Detenninism 
and Responsibility in the Works of George Eliot," 14 Eliot based this belief 
primarily on the refusal to comprehend the will as a causally controlled 
faculty. Of course, this refusal in and of itself is an equivocation; thus, Levine 
goes on to say that this evasive response to the notion of moral responsibility 
in a detennined universe stems from Eliot's moral bias: "Aware of the 
philosophical commonplace that no one can be obliged to do something 
unless he is capable of doing it, yet feeling with equal strength the call to duty 
... [as Mrs. Poyser says, "I see plain enough we shall never do without a 
solution, and that's enough for me."] [Eliot] asserted the common sense point 
that nothing will get done unless we make the effort and that experience tells 
us we can make it." In this, Eliot, as well as Mill, has been criticized by 
absolute detenninists who claim that assuming responsibility for acts that are 
really the results of fixed conditions that produce "caused" or detennined 
decisions is absurd, for how can the will be but the result of perception? 
However, the examination of another intellectual influence that shaped 
Eliot's vision, the work of Benedict de Spinoza, may help to resolve the 
apparent inconsistencies in her thinking. Eliot had read Spinoza's complete 
works by 1856, by which time she had also translated Spinoza's Ethics.1s As 
early as 1849 when she was translating his Theological-Political Treatise, she 
wrote to Sara Hennell: "How exquisite is the satisfaction of feeling that 
another mind sees precisely where and what is the difficulty."16 
We should first say that, like the positivists, Spinoza also presupposes a 
universe of cause and determined effect, but one major point of departure 
from them is that Spinoza's universe is ontologically theistic, that is, 
ultimately set in motion by God; thus, there exists a source for reality, which 
Spinoza ultimately conceives of as demonstrable. According to Spinoza, the 
nature of things is fixed by natural law originating in the mind of God which 
detennines the material universe (natura naturata); but there is also an order 
of true ideas, similar to the platonic notion of eternal fonns (natura naturans), 
which is a process of thought of which man himself is capable that leads to 
spontaneous and transcendant (i.e., "uncaused") decision-making and con-
sequent responsibility on the part of the individual for his decisionsP 
In On The Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza distinguishes be-
tween "essence" (essentia or substantia) and "fiction" (fictum). These 
tenns are defined axiomatically. First, let's define "essence" or what 
Spinoza also calls "a true idea": 
'A true idea ... is something different from its correlate (idea: 
tmn); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle. The idea 
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of a circle is not something having a circumference and a 
centre, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. 
Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is 
capable of being understood through itself .... '18 
This is to say that a body or object can be understood by itself (essentially) and 
not by an idea or correlate representing it; when something is understood in 
this fashion, it is a true idea, that is, knowing a thing~, or in and of itself, 
which is understanding on the intellectual order (Kant would say this is 
impossible, but that problem is beyond our present scope). If I see a chair, I 
can perceive it as an object in space and time and understand its essence by 
its form and function. But if I attempt to reconstruct the history of its coming 
into existence, how and when it was made, for example, I am attempting a 
fictive understanding because I am trying to understand the causes of the chair 
in the natural order (natura naturata), something impossible since without 
being a witness to its construction from scratch, I lack sufficient data. I am 
thus removing the chair from its essence and connecting it to infinite and 
unverifiable possibility. 
There is also a sense in which the creation of fictions in the Spinozan sense 
is analogous simply to jumping to conclusions, as when someone who sees a 
man running down a street and at the same time hears an alarm, becomes 
convinced the man is running from the alarm. In this way the individual has 
seen an effect and attributed to it a fictive cause if there is no connection 
between the two events. Had the individual seen the essence of the various 
actions in their full continuity, that is, both separate acts of the alarm going 
off and the individual running, he would not connect the events falsely, for 
then he perceives the situation essentially ,just as it is possible to see the chair 
in its complete physical reality, although not beyond its present state. But we 
understand a chair because of its shape and use just as we understand a circle 
by its roundness, and cannot separate these essential concepts one from 
another. Thus the chair, circle and situation of the running man allow true 
ideas of them in their essences, and not in their ontologies, or causes, which 
may be impossible to determine. Spinoza tells us we cannot understand 
causes in the natural order because of that order's complexity, but we can 
understand essences on the intellectual plane, and, in fact, one cannot know 
a thing apart from its essence, since the essence of a thing is itself the act of 
knowing it. Perception equals the thing perceived. Therefore, understanding 
a fiction is "feigned" or false understanding.19 
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If one can distinguish thus between fictions and essences, between knowing 
something truly versus knowing it imperfectly, he is able 10 evaluate given 
situations and is responsible for his actions in response to them insofar as his 
understanding is accurate. The issue of accurate understanding is expressed 
by Adam Bede, albeit in more concrete and homely terms. As he says in 
chapter iv: 
'Maybe there's a world about us as we can't see, but the ear's 
quicker than the eye and catches a sound from 't now and then. 
Some people think they get a sight on't too, but they're mostly 
folks whose eyes are not much use to 'em at anything else. For 
my part, I think it's better to see when your perpendicular's 
true, than to see a ghost. '20 
Adam here distinguishes between understanding essence and fiction. Al-
though specifically referring to the supernatural, his comment on ghosts may 
be interpreted as his rejection of trying to understand effects without causes, 
just as "seeing when your perpendicular's true" refers to understanding a 
thing essentially in and of itself. In fact, his tendency 10 think in metaphors 
of carpentry throughout the novel with an emphasis on axiomatic expressions 
is a more general indication of his understanding of essence: "Whenever 
Adam was strongly convinced of a proposition, it took the form of a principle 
in his mind: it was knowledge to be acted on, as much as the knowledge that 
damp will cause rust.' '21 Although Adam does condemn himself, and is 
condemned by Mr. Irwine, for overly formulaic thinking - in part suffering 
from what Nietzsche would call an overdose of "moralic acid" - Eliot still 
affirms that Adam's understanding of things in principle is practical wisdom 
and knowledge to be implemented. That is, it is only with as full an 
understanding of truth as possible can one approach making the right 
decisions, and one is responsible for them in relation to the fullness of that 
understanding. There is also the sense in which true understanding in 
Spinoza's terms is transcendent of the natural order of objects and events 
entirely, the grasp of an object or idea in its autonomous reality, which may 
well form the basis of Eliot's refusal to comprehend the will as causally 
controlled, and her refusal in this light may be understood as a philosophical 
viewpoint and not an equivocation. 
Of course, Adam's vision, which is a paradigm against which the insight of 
the other characters is weighed, is tempered by fictions as well. His "blended 
susceptibility and self-command,' '22 his ability to grasp certain things fully 
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and still misapprehend the causes of others, most notably in his mistaken 
notion of Hetty's motives in her liaison with Arthur Donnithorne, is what 
causes the suffering that brings him to a greater understanding of the 
difference between truth and fiction by the end of the novel, and that 
understanding is what makes him a more responsible being (in the most 
common sense of the word, one is responsible only in so far as he understands 
the consequences of his actions). As Irwine tells Adam in chapter xli: 
'We sometimes form our judgment on what seems strong 
evidence, and yet, for want of knowing some small fact, our 
judgment is wrong. But suppose the worst: you have no right 
to say that the guilt of her crimes lies with him, and that he ought 
to bear the punishment. It is not for us men to apportion the 
shares of moral guilt and retribution .... You have a mind that 
can understand this fully, Adam, when you are calm ... if you 
were to obey your passion [in avenging Hetty] - for it is passion 
and you deceive yourself in calling it justice - it might be with 
you as it has been with Arthur; nay, worse; your passion might 
lead you yourself into a horrible crime.'23 
Irwine's hesitancy to impute evil may be seen as a synthesis of the capacity 
to distinguish essence from fiction on the one hand, and the Feuerbachian 
concept of love on the other. As we've discussed, Feuerbach asserts that 
Christianity invariably forces us to downgrade our fellow man on the absolute 
scale of moral perfection, since, in anthropomorphizing God, man has deified 
himself without realizing that he lacks the perfection and omniscience to 
assume the role. This lack of omniscience is another way of looking at man's 
inability to understand fictions which would become essences if he were 
clearly to see ultimate causes, which is transcendent understanding, and 
which would put man in the position of godhead; although it should be noted 
that according to Spinoza such ultimate understanding in the natural order is 
impossible. However, to return to the Feuerbachian problem of man's self-
deification, when man does so, if unconsciously, he passes moral judgement 
on his fellows, which is a reciprocal function of self-deification, or egoism, 
and in so doing he jumps to conclusions, mistakes the part for the whole, the 
fiction for the true idea, as Irwine implies. Moreover, it is only through love, 
says Feuerbach, through what Spinoza calls union with God or the Divine 
Substance or Essence,24 that we can be freed of human bondage to unhappi-
ness, and this freedom involves an acceptance of one's own limitations in 
order to understand the limitations of humanity in general. If we know 
ourselves, we can know others, and to know, both Eliot, Feuerbach and 
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Spinoza would concur, is to forgive, as well as to love God. 
Of course, Eliot's acceptance of the ethical process throughout her novels is 
couched in esthetic naturalism and abides with a keen didacticism as well as 
good common sense, so she is thus inclined towards the realistic if mildly 
tragic view that altruism can only be arrived at through suffering. Her concept 
of nemesis is not directly relevant to this discussion, but few would argue the 
point that experience is the best teacher. It is experience that generates in 
Adam what Reva Stump has characterized as the positive movement in the 
novel, the movement towards moral vision;25 it is what changes Dinah Morris 
in a less precisely articulated fashion, what seems to bring Arthur out of his 
egoism by the novel's end, and it is what destroys Hetty. In light of what 
happens to the characters and why, at least if we accept the fact that Hetty has 
less capacity for understanding than, say, Adam, as Eliot says she does 
(although her potential for insight and change is not a moot point), how are 
we to hold her responsible for what she does? Absolute determinists contend 
that, despite our potential for free will, we remain defined by our natures; 
thus, how can we blame the irresponsible man for poor judgment or action, 
which would be tantamount to blaming the blind for their blindness or the 
circle for being round. According to Spinoza and, by implication, Eliot, we 
cannot. We may say that a man is responsible for his actions in so far as he 
appreciates their consequences, which is not unlike the legal definition of 
sanity, but it would be a far more complex issue to determine such degree of 
character outside of a novel or play. The issue may be restated as the problem 
of measuring the ability of someone to foresee his fate; as Irwine says: "Our 
deeds determine us as much as we determine our deeds, and until we know 
what has been or will be the peculiar combination of outward with inward 
facts, which constitute a man's critical actions, it will be better not to think 
ourselves too wise about his character."26 
Although the kind of individual who is capable of expanding his vision of 
truth is closer to the paradigm of Adam Bede than, let us say, Hetty Sorrell, 
as we have presented the model, this discussion has attempted to show how 
the individual human mind, although, almost needless to say, determined by 
certain factors, can nevertheless come to a greater understanding of life 
through a process that transcends certain natural or determining causes, a 
process largely dependent on the reciprocity of self and experience, although 
innate sensitivity to the process is necessary as well. We have then suggested 
that insofar as an individual is capable of accomplishing this process, he may 
be deemed conscious of his decisions and actions, and is therefore respon-
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sible, if not for the ultimate consequences of his actions, then at least for 
having initiated them. The issue of absolute determinism and its belief that 
nature is unalterable cannot really be addressed if only because all ultimatums 
are unanswerable by definition, and are not implicitly relevant in what both 
Bemard Paris and Eliot have characterized as the web of experience, a phrase 
denoting the relativity and complexity of cause and effect. That web is so 
limitlessly complex that. as Irwine says, 
'we find it impossible to avoid mistakes in determining who has 
committed a single criminal act, and the problem of how far a 
man is to be held responsible for the unseen consequences of 
his own deed, is one that might well make us tremble to look 
into it. The evil consequences that lie folded in a single act of 
selfish indulgence is a thought so awful that it ought surely to 
awaken some feeling less presumptuous than a rash desire to 
punish?7 
That feeling is love and forgiveness and more, the triumph of spirit over law, 
for here Eliot has stated through her mouthpiece the central element of the 
Christian ethos that transcends the need to be labelled a religious doctrine at 
all, and is no more nor less than righteous kindness. 
In Adam Bede, as in all her major novels, George Eliot recreates life with an 
incisive eye not merely for realistic detail, but with an acute awareness of the 
complexity and ambiguity of moral experience. Adam Bede is a richly 
painted portrait of rural life to which is appended the caption of intellectual 
and moral understanding, and the difficulties of her vivid world brightly 
reflect ours. Her neighbours, friends, lovers, and enemies are ours and we see 
ourselves in the mirror of her mind; so in the novel's epigraph Wordsworth 
echoes the difficulty oflove and forgiveness in a clumsy and imperfect world: 
And when 
I speak of such among my flock as swerved 
Or fell, those only shall be singled out 
Upon whose lapse, or error, something more 
Than brotherly forgiveness may attend. 
That "something more" is for both Eliot and Wordsworth the possibility of 
increased moral awareness through example and experience, since forgive-
ness is useless if the giver proffers it blindly and the taker learns nothing from 
accepting it. In Adam Bede, George Eliot presents us with the difficulties of 
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such blindness and vision recreating the ideas of her beloved philosophers in 
novel fonn, attempting to resolve the problems they pose by presenting their 
abstractions in tenns of character and situation that reflect our own lives and 
the lives of those around us, whom the web of experience has inextricably 
bound to our actions and our hearts. 
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